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RESEARCH ARTICLE
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This paper provides an analysis of Chile’s 35 year experience with deﬁned contribution,
fully funded pensions and argues that this pension approach should not be emulated by
countries seeking to reduce the state role in the provision of pensions. The paper shows
that 35 years of privatized pensions have led to a massive accumulation and
concentration of capital and proﬁts in the hands of the pension fund administrators
and insufﬁcient and unequal pensions for the retirees. This legacy of the Pinochet
dictatorship has experienced marginal reforms after the transition to democracy.
However, those reforms have not altered the system’s structure and have augmented
the ﬁscal role as the state attempts to repair some the most damaging outcomes of the
private pension scheme.
Keywords: chile; Latin America; social security; privatization of pensions; retirement
income; fully funded; deﬁned contributions pensions; social policy
1. Introduction
This article rests on the premise that the design of social security and the distribution of
retirement income are closely inter-twined. It is widely accepted in the social policy lit-
erature that universal statutory income-transfer programs, such as social insurance
schemes, and non-contributory citizen’s pensions, represent the most effective means
of ameliorating income deprivation in old age (Hyde & Dixon, 2009). Private pensions
are typically dismissed as a neoliberal alternative that intensiﬁes retirement income inse-
curity, and retiree poverty, while enriching the ﬁnancial services institutions that manage
worker’s savings. This critique of privatization is given credibility by our analysis of
Chile’s pioneering system of privately administered, deﬁned contribution (DC),
pension scheme. Although privatization was justiﬁed ideologically in terms of improving
the retirement prospects of workers, Chile’s 35-year-old experience shows that privatiza-
tion has generated insufﬁcient pensions and retiree income inequalities, while enabling
pension fund managers to generate enormous revenue streams. While subsequent
reforms have improved coverage and augmented the retirement prospects of particular
groups of workers, they have failed to rectify fundamental problems and forced a re-
engagement of the state to offset some of the failures of the private pension system.
Studying the nature and impact of Chile’s privately administered, DC system is critically
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important because the Chilean reform served as a model for subsequent reforms
implemented throughout Latin America and Eastern Europe. These reforms that were
supported and promoted by International Financial Organizations such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Reﬂecting on a substantial an ongoing program of research (Borzutzky, 2002, 2010;
Borzutzky & Hyde, forthcoming; Hyde & Dixon, 2009), we pursue our analysis of
Chile’s private pension system in this article in ﬁve distinctive ways. Importantly, the
ﬁrst section articulates an historical review of the development of Chile’s private
pension system, particularly the salient features of the 1981 pension reform which
created it, and the nature of its core provisions, including private fund management,
the DC principle, and the requirement for schemes to be fully funded (FF). In this
section we also introduce our theoretical framework and argue that this reform was
not the product of a neoliberal approach to retirement, but of a conservative approach
that sought to make the pension system compulsory, limited the number and type of
ﬁnancial entities involved in the administration of pension funds, and created a privileged
position for the pension fund administrators through a complex regulatory system. This
privileged position has allowed the pension fund administrators to rip large proﬁts, while
pensions are insufﬁcient and the role of the state supplementing those pensions continue
to increase.
The second section evaluates the impact of the 1981 reform which introduced a pioneer-
ing DC system. In a DC system the employee contributes to his/her individual account at a
set rate, and the contributions are invested and administered on the employee’s behalf by a
designated ﬁnancial institution. A DC pension approach does not promise a speciﬁc amount
of beneﬁts at retirement, as it is the case in a deﬁned beneﬁt system, but the employee will
ultimately receive the balance in the account, which is based on contributions plus or minus
investment gains or losses and minus fees paid for the administration of the monies. In this
section we argue that the impact of the DC pension approach has been largely negative for
both the retirees and the state generating inadequate pension coverage, excessive adminis-
tration costs and management charges, diminutive investment returns, and an approach to
the regulation of pensions that has disadvantaged workers by giving substantial market pri-
vileges to the corporate actors responsible for managing the system.
The third section addresses the 2008 pension reform, focusing on the role of the state
in supplementing, supporting, and subsidizing the private pension system. In particular,
we highlight elements of the reform relating to pension coverage, including the treatment
of independent workers (the self-employed), and the retirement prospects of women, who
have been acutely disadvantaged in pension terms. Section four evaluates several of the
provisions of the 2008 reform against a range of criteria. Drawing on some of the most
recent data available, the ﬁfth section appraises the effectiveness of current retirement
provision in augmenting the retirement prospects of Chilean workers. Because the
beneﬁts of the 2008 reform were partial, a further round of pension reform is on the leg-
islative horizon.
The paper concludes by arguing that in spite of attempts to improve the retirement
beneﬁts provided by the FF, privately administered pension system, the privately admi-
nistered pension fund system has remained unchanged and the model continuous provid-
ing disproportionate beneﬁts to the pension fund managers and insufﬁcient beneﬁts to
the retirees. Thus, Chile provides a very useful example of a ﬂawed pension model
that should not be emulated by other countries seeking to reduce ﬁscal involvement
in the provision of retirement beneﬁts because it fails to reduce both inequality and
poverty.
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2. Chile’s retirement system in historical perspective
Chile, a country of almost 18 million people and with an economically active population
(EAP) of about 8.5 million, was a pioneer in pension privatization and its 1981 reform
inspired both theWorld Bank and other countries to recommend and pursue similar policies.
Between 1924 and the early 1970s, retirement provision in Chile was structured predo-
minantly around a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) ﬁnanced Common Fund system, which devel-
oped in a very amorphous and unique form. By 1973 it covered about 75% of the EAP
through more than 600 small and 35 major funds, and through substantial legislation
geared to provide special beneﬁts to those interest groups that could exercise political
and/or economic power (Borzutzky, 2002).
In the case of Chile, the development of what Mesa-Lago aptly called the “massiﬁca-
tion” of social security beneﬁts in the mid-twentieth century was followed by a massiﬁca-
tion of privileges and exemptions that substantially distorted the basic notions of equality
and universality that should be at the core of a retirement system (Mesa-Lago, 1976). As a
result, the provision of social security became expensive for the state, the insured, and the
employers; was suffused with administrative and ﬁnancial inefﬁciencies; and was inher-
ently unequal. In fact, the multiple funds reinforced patterns of socio-economic inequality
present in wider Chilean society because although a minority of privileged workers
received a wide array of generous beneﬁts, the pensions received by the majority of the
population were insufﬁcient for their needs. Attempts to reform and rationalize the admin-
istrative and ﬁnancial dimensions of the pension system during the Alessandri and Frei
administrations (1958–1964 and 1964–1970) were frustrated by powerful interest groups
and their representatives in the Chilean Congress (Borzutzky, 2002).
While it is clear that the social security system needed a major reform, including the
elimination of the multiple funds and privileged pensions, it is not so clear that the
system needed the reform that was introduced by the military dictatorship of Augusto Pino-
chet (1973–1989). As argued elsewhere, the 1980 social security reform was a bi-product of
the institutional power and neoliberal ideas of the “Chicago Boys”, General Pinochet’s
economic advisors (Borzutzky, 2002). The ideology of the free market and individualism
expounded by the military dictatorship’s policy-makers, supported by high levels of repres-
sion and the destruction of Chile’s political institutions, produced a far-reaching transform-
ation of the role of the state, its socio-economic policies, and the country’s economy, and
society. In the labor and social security areas, substantial reforms were developed and
implemented by Labor Minister José Piñera. Piñera argued that the old system had failed
to achieve its goals, and that instead of creating a more egalitarian society, it had created
unjustiﬁable privileges and inequalities. The Chicago Boys engineered a radical overhaul
of the social security system by replacing it with a privately administered, compulsory,
FF, DC pension system. Reﬂecting its ostensible commitment to both the market and indi-
vidualism, and its aim to reduce labor costs, the reform eliminated the portion of the social
security tax paid by the employer. The newly created compulsory “savings/pension”
scheme was to be privately administered, but supervised by the state. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the state’s supervisory role was created not to protect consumers, but to
protect the interests of the corporate agents responsible for managing worker’s pensions
(Borzutzky, 2002). The transference of the administration to the private sector involved
the creation of a new type of enterprise: The Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones
(Pension Fund Managing Corporations), or AFPs. The AFPs are the only entities empow-
ered to administer the pension funds, are for-proﬁt corporations, and charge commissions
for the management of the individual accounts.
Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 59
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Central to the FF, DC pension reform was the elimination of the principle of social soli-
darity and its replacement by the notion of individual responsibility – but in this case it was
compulsory individual responsibility. Thus, the privatized scheme was made mandatory for
all the workers who joined the work force after December 1981, while those already
employed could choose between the PAYG Common Fund and the private system. In prac-
tice, younger workers and employees in the private sector moved in large numbers to the
private pension arrangement because of the impact of a massive propaganda campaign
launched by the government and the AFPs, and because of the sizeable reduction in con-
tributions under the DC system. On the other hand, many workers in the public sector,
and older workers, remained in the PAYG system. It is of course ironic that while the
reform took place under a military regime that had adopted a free market mantra, those
charged with the responsibility of upholding the Pinochet regime, the military and the
police, retained their state-administered PAYG pensions that had existed since the 1920s.
The individual pension funds, or savings accounts, areﬁnanced by a 10%wage tax paid only
by employees – employers and the state are exempt from contributing ﬁnancially to workers’
pensions under the private system. In addition, workers are permitted to make additional volun-
tary contributions above the mandatory 10%, which are administered in separate funds estab-
lished by the AFPs, with the sole purpose of managing voluntary contributions (Gobierno de
Chile. Decree-Law 3500). From an administrative standpoint, privatization entailed the disap-
pearance of the old funds and the creation of a uniﬁed administrative system under the Instituto
de Normalización Previsional, renamed Instituto de Prevision Social (IPS) in 2008. The IPS
administers the Bono de Reconocimiento, or Recognition Bond, which represents the amount
of money accumulated in the PAYG system. These moneys are transferred to the individual
account at the time of retirement. Other administrative units include the Superintendencia de
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, known today as Superintendencia de Pensiones,
which is in charge of licensing, supervising, regulating, and dissolving AFPs.
Pensions are provided either directly by the AFP through programmed withdrawals,
indirectly through an annuity bought from an insurance company with the funds accumu-
lated in the account, or through a combination of the two. When the annuity option is
chosen the accumulated funds are permanently transferred to an insurance company,
which determines the amount of the pension, as well as funeral and survivors’ beneﬁts.
The annuity must be inﬂation-protected and provide for survivors’ beneﬁts (Reyes &
Pino, 2006). When a programmed withdrawal is chosen, the pension is determined annually
by the AFP on the basis of the afﬁliate’s life expectancy and the assets’ rate of return. If the
retiree exhausts his/her account assets, he/she qualiﬁes for a state-provided minimum
pension (Asociación de AFPs, 2000, pp. 1 and 2). In the case of disability and survivors’
pensions, the beneﬁt is paid directly by the AFP.
The state also acquired the obligation to provide Minimum Pensions to those in the
private pension system who did not have enough money saved to have a pension equal
to the statutory minimum. To supplement and complement the pension system, the 1981
reform established a means-tested and parsimonious Welfare Pension for those who are
below the poverty level and had not contributed to the system.
3. The negative impact of the 1980 reform
The privatization of pensions affected the entire society as well as the state, but any beneﬁts
arising from the reform came to be distributed in a highly unequal manner. We now have
more than 30 years of data on the socio-economic effects of pension privatization, and
this leads to the conclusion that the FF, DC system is expensive, concentrates income in
60 S. Borzutzky and M. Hyde
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
en
ins
ula
 M
ed
ica
l S
ch
oo
l U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:1
4 1
0 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
the hands of the Pension Fund Administrators, generates huge proﬁts for the AFPs, is exclu-
sionary, and discriminates against women (Borzutzky, 2002, 2008, 2011). Moreover, ﬁscal
responsibilities for the Minimum Pensions and Bonos de Reconocimiento have created a
persistent budget deﬁcit which has been ﬁnanced by taxes paid by all Chileans. This
section develops an analysis of the impact of privatization up to 2007, which can be illus-
trated in six ways.
3.1. Excessive management charges
The reform promised an efﬁcient pension market in which management charges, fees, and
commissions would be determined by competition. However this promise, like many of the
other promises made by the architects of the reform, has not been realized. The number of
AFPs operating in the market declined substantially during the period 1980–2007 resulting
in signiﬁcant pension fund management industry concentration, and this has circumscribed
competition and efﬁciency. Today, there are only six AFPs responsible for managing
worker’s savings, and although management charges have ﬂuctuated, they have remained
exceedingly high. A World Bank report estimated that pension fund administrators have
retained between a quarter and a third of workers’ contributions in the form of commissions,
insurance, and other administrative fees since the inception of the system (Gill, Packard, &
Yermo, 2004). This is corroborated by Mesa-Lago who estimated that by 2008 the AFPS
retained about 27% of the deposit (Mesa-Lago, 2014, p. 9). Privatization of pensions has
led to a massive concentration of income in the hands of the AFPs (over 60% of GDP is
controlled by the AFPs), while the proﬁtability of the companies in the early years of the
twentieth century was estimated to be over 50% (Gill et al., 2004). Additionally,
between 1993 and 1997, the rate of proﬁts of the industry was double the rate of proﬁt
of any other industry in the country, but after 1998 this process became even more pro-
nounced and the rate of proﬁts of the AFPs reached annual rate of 53% (Valdés & Marino-
vic, 2005). The AFPs administrative charges are 89% more expensive than banks or private
stock brokers charges (Valdés, 1999). The question of high proﬁts is compounded by the
lack of market competition and the fact that since its inception the number of AFPs has
been reduced to ﬁve and that the three largest AFPS manage 86% of all the accounts
(Mesa-Lago, 2014, p. 6).
We should also note that the imposition of management charges in the new privatized
retirement system operated in a regressive way that penalized the poorest. As a percentage
of the average salary, the value of the commissions decreased from 3.57% in 1982 to 2.43%
in 2003 (Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (SAFP), 2003,
p. 9). However, the charges have been quite regressive and this has not changed. For
instance, for an insured person with an income of about US $1609, the administrative
costs ﬂuctuated between 25.6% and 37.9% of the deposit; while the cost for an insured
person with an income of US $13,000 ﬂuctuated between 24.1% and 30.2% of the
deposit (SAFP, 148, Dec, 1998, pp. 28–32). The FF system has also had a very powerful
effect on the AFPs owners due to the massive transference of funds from the public to
the private sector of the economy. By March of 2003, the combined amount of capital accu-
mulated in the hands of the AFPs amounted to 55.77% of GDP (SAFP, 2003, p. 5).
But however large Chilean pension fund management fees might appear to be, can we
think of them as excessive? One way of addressing this is to compare management charges
in Chile’s private pension with those of other ﬁnancial services and institutions. As
suggested earlier, Chile has had the third highest level of charging for pension fund manage-
ment among the mandatory DC pension schemes of Latin America. Other scholars of
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Chilean social security have concurred with our analysis. Valdés (1995) for example com-
pares management charges in ten DC pension arrangements, and concludes that Chile
belongs to the group of “expensive” countries – like us, he ﬁnds that it has been the
third most expensive. In a more recent analysis, Valdés and Bateman (1999) compare man-
agement charges in the mandated DC pensions of Australia and Chile, and ﬁnd that the
latter has been up to 60% higher. They estimate that Australian plan participants have
paid 30% less in management charges over the entire accumulation period. Similar ﬁndings
can be generated if we broaden our analysis to include other types of ﬁnancial institutions.
According to a study of Chile’s privately administered retirement system, AFP management
charges have been up to two-thirds higher than the fees imposed by the country’s banks for
administering savings and on-time accounts (Hyde, Dixon, & Drover, 2006). For the period
1997–1998, Valdés and Bateman show that AFP charges were up to 67% higher than fees
for the management of savings accounts, and professional asset management services else-
where in the ﬁnancial sector, which were less exposed to intrusive state regulation. This evi-
dence gives some credibility to the belief that Chilean pension fund management charges
during the period of our analysis were “excessive”.
3.2. Diminished coverage
There has been considerable discussion about the extent of the coverage provided by the FF,
DC system since its inception. Data for 2003 shows a marked decline in coverage, since the
AFP system was covering only 52.5% of the EAP, with another 2.72% still enrolled in the
common fund system. By 2007, about 50% of the population was excluded from the
system, and a large portion of those who contributed were not be able to save enough to
obtain the equivalent to a minimum pension forcing the state to fund those pensions
through its Minimum Pension program. Moreover, the pension system had left out a
large portion of the population including the self-employed and all those Chileans that
have either been unemployed, or had a part time employment during their active life.
Additionally, the privately administered pension system was seen as discriminating
openly against women because women live longer than men, their salaries are about
30% lower than the salary of their male counterparts, and they contribute less because of
child rearing and other family responsibilities (Arenas de Mesa & Montecinos, 1996).
As a result, the data shows a dismal situation in terms of the number of female contributors,
the number of women accessing FF pensions, and the replacement ratio of their pensions.
By 2007, only 39% of women (versus 61% of men) were actively contributing to a pension
and only 54% of all retirees were women as opposed to 69% of men (Mesa-Lago, 2014,
p. 6). While the question of replacement ratios is complex and it will be addressed later,
it is important to note that the replacement ratio for women is about 35% while the replace-
ment ratio for men is about 46% (Mesa-Lago, 2014, p. 6).
3.3. Sub-optimal investment performance
Even though the fees have been higher than in comparable ﬁnancial services and insti-
tutions, Chile’s pension fund management charges could have been deemed justiﬁable if
it could be demonstrated that plan participants were able to beneﬁt from superior investment
returns by paying more. Scholars of Chilean social security who endorse the privately admi-
nistered retirement system have not been slow to highlight the impressive investment
returns that have been generated by AFP involvement in asset allocation. For one survey
of Chile’s fund managers, the average investment return for the period 1981 to 2000 was
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11%, 3.8% higher than the average interest rate for bank deposits (Acuña & Iglesias, 2001).
Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the investment performance of
Chile’s fund managers has been sub-optimal, falling short of the returns that would be
necessary to justify their considerable income streams. In this respect, we should recall
that the ostensible purpose of management charges is to render payment for the service
of generating investment-driven increments to the value of retirement assets, which
means that it is returns to plan participants that ultimately count. Much of the evidence
around net returns – which are a function of investment returns and management charges
– suggests that the performance of the AFPs during the ﬁrst two decades of the ‘private’
system was rather less impressive. When returns are estimated in this way, they are
‘more than halved from what has been reported by the AFPs and conservative pundits’
(Leiva, 2006, p. 7). According to one authoritative study (Acuña & Iglesias, 2001), the
AFPs generated an average net return of 5.1% during the ﬁrst two decades; while Kay
(2003) estimates average net returns of 0.3% for the period 1982–1986, and 2.1 for
1991–1995. Even during the “good times” of the ﬁrst two decades then, there is evidence
that might lead us to question the assertion that high management charges were grounded in
superior investment returns.
In large measure this reﬂects the substantial re-composition of Chile’s pension fund
management industry. As highlighted earlier in this article, its remarkable and sustained
concentration has eroded market competition, accentuating the tendency towards correlated
trading. Not surprisingly there is evidence to suggest that regulatory-induced herding has
impacted negatively on performance, generating a downward trend in realized investment
returns. Looking only at the six largest AFPs, the evidence highlights an inverse relation-
ship between the degree of concentration in the pension fund management industry and its
investment performance. During the ﬁrst fourteen years, when the number of AFPs grew
substantially, monthly investment returns for all six fund managers ranged between
−1.8% and 8.6%, and negative returns were uncommon (thus a period marked by more
fund managers and better returns); during the period 1995–2000, when concentration
was starting to become more salient, investment returns ranged between −6.4% and
6.6% and negative returns were common (growing concentration, diminishing returns);
but during the period 2001–2004, when industry concentration was most prominent, invest-
ment returns ranged between −1.6% and 2.5%, and the incidence of negative returns was
high (high concentration, low returns) (Borzutzky & Hyde, forthcoming).
3.4. Insufﬁcient beneﬁts
Contrary to the expectations created by the architects of the program, the value of the pen-
sions offered by the FF, DC system has not changed dramatically either. In 2001, the value
of an average FF pension was 12% higher than the value of a pension provided by the
common fund system, but in the case of disability pensions the pension provided by the
common fund system was 23% higher than the pension provided by the FF system
(SAFP, 2001, p. 199). A comparative 2014 study done by the Instituto Libertad y Desar-
rollo, a right of center think tank, which included 976,000 retirees concludes that the
AFPs pay an average old age pension of about US $354, while the Instituto de Prevision
Social in charge of paying the pensions of those who remained in the PAYG system pay
an average old age pension of US $390. It is important to keep in mind that while the
AFP afﬁliates’ total contribution liability 13% of the wages (basic 10% of the wages
plus additional contributions for special programs), the contribution made in the public
system amounts to 20.7% (El Mercurio.com, July 6, 2014).
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3.5. Income inequality
What has been the pension system’s impact on inequality and income distribution? The tran-
sition to democracy has brought about a massive decline in poverty, from over 50% of the
population in 1990 to 14.4% in 2013. However, the country’s distribution of income
remains highly unequal and unchanged. As a result, the Gini Coefﬁcient declined slightly
from 0.53 in 1990 to 0.50 in 2013 (Encuesta Casen, 2013). Moreover, when the Gini coefﬁ-
cient is used to measure the distribution of pension income, a 2005 government report estab-
lished that “the distribution of retirement income is much more unequal than the distribution
of active life income for the same cohort… . The same can be said for the level of minimum
pension guaranteed by the state” (Reyes & Pino, 2006). Thus, the Gini Index for retirement
income is higher than the actual Gini Index of about 0.52. Moreover, a 2013 Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’ pension study reafﬁrms the negative re-
distributional impact of the pension system through its progressivity index. According to this
index, a perfectly progressive system gets a score of a 100 while a system that does not have
any impact on progressivity gets a 0. Chile’s index is 27.9, a number well below 39 which is
the average for all OECD countries and 82 which is the average for Anglophone countries
(OECD, 2013, Pensions at a Glance). Thus the OECD study conﬁrms that the current
pension system does not have a positive impact on income redistribution and in fact
reinforces the skewed distribution of income present in the Chilean economy.
Turning speciﬁcally to the issue of women’s pensions it is important to note that female
labor force participation increased from 35% in 1990 to 55% in 2011, but it is still 7% below
OECD and Latin American averages. Moreover, there was an increase of the share of
women’s participation in the labor force from 30% in 1990 to 40% in 2011, in part due
to the decline in male participation in the labor force. Lastly, the gender wage gap
deﬁned as the ratio of the male to female wages, declined from 1.4 to 1.2 during the
same period. This gap is close to OECD and Latin American averages (IMF, 2014).
Women’s participation in the DC system and gender inequalities in retirement income
can be illustrated starkly with reference to evidence regarding replacement rates. In practice,
the replacement ratio can be calculated either on the bases of the last wage or on the bases of
the average wage received in the last ten years. A government study looked at retirees with
more than 30 years of savings and estimated that the ratio was of 66% for men and 42% for
women based on the wages obtained in the ten years prior to retirement. While a study done
by OECD established that the net ratio –after paying taxes- was of 52% for men and 42%
for women (El Mercurio.com, October 20, 2014).
In brief, by 2006 it had become clear that many Chileans were dissatisﬁed with the
pension system because of the high administrative costs and the low replacement ratios.
Dissatisfaction with the system became clear in 2005 as the ﬁrst group of retirees began
to collect pensions. These retirees, and others that followed them, felt cheated by the
system and began to lobby for pension reform through the Association of Pension
Damaged People which quickly grew to about 150,000 members. In fact, the dissatisfaction
with the system not only served as the foundation for an anti-DC pension group, but also
coined a new term which is now widely used in Chile: daño previsional, or pension damage
(Delgado, 2007). More recently, in 2011, the AcusaChileAFP lobby was formed to criticize
the existing policies and demand major pension reforms (AcusaChile). This dissatisfaction
has been conﬁrmed by the Bravo Commission’ survey conducted in 2014 which revealed
that 72% of those polled believed that pensions will improve only if there is a total change
in the AFP system and that 66% considered that the low pensions are responsibility of the
AFPS (Cambio 21)
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Lastly, it had also become clear to experts and government ofﬁcials that reforms were
needed because of a growing budget deﬁcit resulting from the government obligation to pay
an ever larger number of minimum pensions. This deﬁcit has remained close to 5% per year
(Melguizo, Muñoz, Tuesta, & Vial, 2009 [BBVA working papers, 2009]).
3.6. Fiscal impact
The operation of the private pension system during the period 1980–2007 also impacted
adversely on the ﬁscal capacity of the state. The creation of the fully funded, DC system
did not reduce, but simply changed the role of the state. In reality, the state continued to
have a large number of pension responsibilities with regard to retirement income protection,
since it was paying the pensions of those who stayed in the Common Fund system; was
paying the Recognition Bond at the time of retirement of those who began in the
Common Fund system and then transferred to the FF system; and it was paying the
Minimum and Welfare Pensions. The two most expensive elements of the private
pension system were the payment of Recognition Bonds, which were expected to diminish
over time, and the payment of Minimum Pensions, which were expected to increase in the
future. As a result, these responsibilities have produced a budget deﬁcit close to 5% of GDP
per year (Borzutzky, 2002, Ch. 7, BVA, p. 13).
4. New horizons? The 2008 reform
Between 1990 and 2005, Chileans elected to the presidency members of the center-left Con-
certación coalition formed by Christian Democratic, Socialist and other smaller parties.
Reﬂecting the negative impacts of privatization, Socialist presidential candidate Michelle
Bachelet promised to reform the retirement system and shortly after her inauguration in
January 2006, she established the Marcel Commission to study the pension system and
propose reforms. The overall goals of reform, as articulated by the Commission’s report
presented to President Bachelet in July 2006, were to move the country toward the univer-
salization of beneﬁts, augment the pension system’s replacement ratio from 45% to the
OECD average which is 60%, and reduce the variability of the replacement rate due to
differences in the density of contributions and the different proﬁtability of the accounts
associated with different socio-economic and income groups. The reform also aimed at
eliminating the risk of old age poverty by strengthening both the Welfare and Minimum
Pensions, and proposing the creation of a strong and well integrated Solidarity Pillar.
The goals of the Solidarity Pillar were to protect and integrate low income groups into
the pension system, provide mechanisms to increase the density of contributions,
develop new approaches geared to increase competence among the AFPs, increase the
funds’ rates of return, increase transparency in the management of the pension funds,
and strengthen the voluntary pillar by providing new beneﬁts to those who manage to
have additional savings (Consejo Reforma Previsional, pp. 98–101).
Another important problem tackled by the report, and subsequent legislation, was the
low level of coverage and the low density of contributions, especially among lower
income groups. In fact, 28 years after implemented, the FF, DC scheme covered only
about 60% of the population and had systematically excluded the majority of the indepen-
dent workers who, given the volatilities and lack of contractual arrangements in the Chilean
labor market, comprised a large portion of the population. Moreover, the same volatile labor
market conditions had generated a low density of contributions (Report Comisión Marcel,
p. 111). Months of Congressional discussion and multiple legislative maneuvers resulted in
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a negotiated reform bill. In January 2008, the Chilean Congress approved not all, but some
of the most important proposals of the Marcel Commission.
The most important accomplishment of the 2008 legislation (Gobierno de Chile. Law
20255) was to guarantee a Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS) to all Chileans over 65 years
oldwho had never contributed to the pension system.By 2013 the value of the PBS amounted
to US $160 (Gobierno de Chile. Subsecretaría de Previsión Social). The state also guarantees
a Supplementary Contribution (Aporte Previsional Solidario, APS) to those who have insuf-
ﬁcient contributions to ﬁnance their retirement beneﬁts. To qualify for the state contribution
the afﬁliate must have made contributions to an AFP, but the value of the accumulated funds
should generate a pension that is less than US $520 (Superintendencia de Pensions, Aporte
Previsional Solidario de Vejez). This beneﬁt is calculated on the basis of accumulated
savings and is expected to provide pensions equivalent to 60% of those in the lowest
income groups (Gobierno de Chile. Reforma Previsional Gobierno de Chile). The govern-
ment also provides a Basic Disability Pension to those covered by the PBS. In brief, the
state acquired a number of new responsibilities and the most important of those is the PBS
that was designed to reduce old age poverty by expanding coverage and providing a
pension to workers that for a variety of reasons had never established a pension account in
an AFP. Most favored by the PBS are workers who have been in and out of the labor
market, temporary and independent workers, and women. It is estimated that 60% of the soli-
darity pensions will be devoted to women. Those who started to save, but did not accumulate
sufﬁcient assets receive the APS and the state also provide disability pensions to all those
covered by the PBS and the APS.
In order to augment the value of women’s pensions, the 2008 lawmandates 18months of
state contributions per child. The state contribution is based on a minimum salary. Although
the money is not deposited into the account until the woman turns 65, the contribution begins
to generate interests from themoment the child is born.Moreover, becausewomen do not use
the disability and survival pensions asmuch asmen, the part of the deposit that is not used for
these items is deposited directly in the woman’s account. The goal here was to increase
women’s pensions and to reduce the existing pension gender gap. The architects of the
2008 reform argued that as citizens, women are entitled to the same pension beneﬁts as
men, and that the state is obligated to rectify inequalities that result from gender differentials
in labor force participation (Comisión Marcel Report, pp. 118–120).
Regarding independent workers, the legislation introduced a ten year transitional period
to integrate them into the pension system. By the end of this period the independent workers
should be contributing and receiving the same beneﬁts as dependent workers. The entrance
of new independent workers into the system is regulated by the state through a “bidding
system” according to which every year the state groups those interested in joining the
pension scheme into “packets” and the AFPs have to offer formal bids to capture the
packet. The bids must specify commissions and other administrative costs. Once an AFP
obtains a “packet” of insured, it cannot increase the commissions for at least 18 months.
In order to encourage expansion of the pension system and young workers contributions,
the government also subsidizes the pensions of workers between 18–35 years of age
with an income that is less than 1.5 of the minimum salary.
The 2008 law also favors middle income groups through the creation of a system of Volun-
tary Pension Savings (Ahorro Previsional Voluntario). These voluntary savings enjoy a number
of tax beneﬁts and can be deposited not only with AFPs, but also in a number of other ﬁnancial
entities including insurance companies, mutual funds and banks among. The goal here is to
incentivize savings and allow the individual a wide variety of both institutional and risk
options (Superintendencia de Pensiones, El Sistema Chileno de Pensiones, 2014 p. 99).
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From a ﬁnancial standpoint, the 2008 reform was more expensive than any other social
program created in Chile between 1990 and 2010. According to Hujo and Ralli (2014), the
ﬁscal costs associated with the reform were estimated to increase from 0.27% of GDP in
2009 to over 1% in 2025 (p. 14). The 2008 legislation established that the reforms’ costs
were to be ﬁnanced through the Pension Reserve Fund established in 2006. As a result
of the 2008 reform, by December of 2012 the government had provided 406,674 PBS pen-
sions which amounted to about 35.2% of all the pensions granted (Hujo and Rulli, p. 18).
5. Impact of the 2008 reform
The most critical impact of the 2008 reform has been the introduction for the ﬁrst time since
1980 of a social component into the pension system through the addition of the Solidarity
Pillar, or state ﬁnanced pillar which supports the expansion of pensions to lower income
groups, young workers and women. Moreover, the incorporation of new workers
through a system of bids seems to have led to a reduction in the administrative costs for
that group of workers and the strengthening of the voluntary savings component, or third
pillar of the system, fostering an increase in voluntary savings.
As well as these beneﬁcial impacts, the state has gained because in the long run the
addition of the Solidarity Pillar will imply a reduction of the ﬁscal costs. As mentioned
above, the transition from the PAYG to the privatized system entailed a number of ﬁscal
costs including paying for the Bono de Reconocimiento and the Minimum andWelfare Pen-
sions, as well the payment of the pensions of those who chose to remain in the PAYG
modality. These transition costs have been sizeable and have evolved over time. Transition
costs amounted to 7.6% of GDP in the early 2000 and had declined to about 5% in 2008 and
4.7% in 2010, but where expected to remain high given the increase in the state’s payment
of Minimum Pensions. Estimates made by the Marcel Commission and also by Carmelo
Mesa-Lago show a reduction of transition costs as a result of the 2008 reform. The law
also created a reserve fund to ﬁnance the new beneﬁts (Mesa-Lago, 2014, pp. 17–20).
While the 2008 law represents a step in the right direction regarding expansion of pen-
sions to lower income groups and women, improving the chances that future lower income
retirees have to obtain higher pensions and higher replacement rates, and reducing the
state’s ﬁscal burden, there were important recommendations made by the Marcel Commis-
sion that were not included in the legislation due to opposition from the political right and
the AFPs. Among them were the incorporation of banks into the Pension Fund Adminis-
tration business in order to introduce competitiveness in the pension administration
business and the creation of a state managed AFP, both having the potential of expanding
competition and lowering costs. Because these recommendations were not included in the
ﬁnal legislation, and because there is no mechanism in place to reign in the administrative
charges, the reform does little to change the monopolistic nature of the AFPs, left the ques-
tion of the high commissions or administrative charges untouched, and failed to resolve the
problem of the insufﬁciency of pensions due to high administrative charges. These pro-
blems are being tackled by yet another reform commission –the Bravo Commission-
created by President Bachelet in early 2014.
6. The Chilean retirement system today
Finally, we turn to the performance of Chile’s retirement system today. This discussion
highlights several of the problems faced by the pension system and the retirees, and ana-
lyzes the solutions proposed to address these issues.
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In 1973 Chile’s social security system covered about 73% of the EAP and by late 2014
the combined FF pension scheme and the remnants of the old PAYG system covered the
same 73% of the EAP. A total of 9.7 million Chileans are registered in one of the six
AFPs, but only 4.9 million of those are active contributors. The total savings accumulated
in the hands of the pension fund administrators amounted to US $163,196 million or about
69% of the Chilean GDP in 2013. The data also shows that the AFP system has provided
pensions to 998,457 retirees with an average pension of about US $400 monthly (El Mer-
curio.com, July 23, 2014).
As highlighted above, estimating replacement rates is complicated given the different
measurement that can be used. These difﬁculties also reﬂect the impact that the density
of contributions can have on any measurement. In consequence, our assessment of
income replacement here relies on a range of ratios. Thus, today replacement rates range
from 11% to 55% of the wages for men and from 8% to 40% for women. The variability
or range is determined by the number of years of active contributions and the consistency
– or density – of contributions made into the savings account. In practice, a woman who had
a full active life and never missed a month of deposit will get a pension equal to 40% of her
wages, and a man in the same circumstances will get a pension equal to 55% of his wages.
The data also shows that on average men make deposits for about 25 years out of a 45 year
working life while women register about 15 years of deposits out of 35 year work life. As a
result, the replacement rate for women is a lot smaller. A study by the Piñera administration
compiled in what is known as the PensionWhite Book estimates that more than half of retir-
ees have pensions that are less than 48% of the average wage received in the last ten years of
active life (Jimeno Ocares, 2014). By comparison, average replacement rates in OECD
countries amount to 65.8%.
Between1991and2009 the average old agepension increased by11%,butwe should note
that the real growth of an old age pension was of about 2% per year; that there was no real
growth if the retiree had to take early retirement, or retired due to disability; and that in the
cases of widows and children pensions, there was a 4% real growth of pensions. Alongside
this modest performance with regard to beneﬁt entitlements, AFP income generated by man-
agement charges amounted to US $766 million by September of 2013 (El Mercurio.com,
January 27, 2014). As for the Solidarity Pillar established in 2008, and fully implemented
in 2012, the costs to the state were equivalent to US $1621 million per year. The Basic Soli-
darity Pension amounts to about US $180 and it is given to men and women over 65 years of
age that are among the poorest 60% of the population (Jimeno Ocares, 2014).
As this data suggests, although the 2008 reform managed to expand the coverage, it did
not substantially increase the value of the pensions provided by the AFPs. As a result, in
early 2014 the newly reelected President Bachelet faced a multitude of claims and
popular dissatisfaction with the state of the pension program. The government addressed
this disenchantment by forming a second commission, charged with examining the
nature of the system’s problems, and with identifying appropriate solutions. The commis-
sion comprised of 23 experts, and ofﬁcially known Comisión Asesora Presidencial sobre el
Sistema de Pensiones (2015), or Pension System Advisory Presidential Commission, gen-
erated feedback from 78 different national and international experts over a 6 month period.
Its central mission is to tackle the never resolved problem of pensions’ insufﬁciency, repla-
cement rates that are well below the expectations of the current and potential retirees, and
the high administrative costs. A survey conducted by the Bravo Commission showed that
over 70% of those interviewed do not approve of the current system.
As understood by the Commission’s members and their advisors, low pension and
replacement rates result from a number of factors including high administrative charges,
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insufﬁcient contributions (the mandatory deposit is of only 10% of the wages), the lack of
employer contributions, and inequalities in the minimum retirement age (60 years for
women and 65 years for men). In order to address these problems, the Bravo Commission
considered a variety of proposals including allowing banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
to administer the pension funds, and the creation of a state-owned and administered AFP in
order to increase competitiveness and reduce administrative charges – the same solutions
proposed, but never adopted in 2008. According to its proponents, a state-administered
AFP will provide Chileans with one more savings option which could be very attractive
to independent and low income workers, and would allow for an increase in the density
of contributions. A prominent expert on Chilean pensions, Salvador Valdés, proposed the
establishment of not-for-proﬁt administrators, including unions, in order to reduce costs
and capture the independent workers (El Mercurio.com, October 7, 2014). Others have cri-
ticized the proposal for a state-owned AFP on several grounds: it will not generate higher
returns; it will be difﬁcult to sustain unless it generates proﬁts for the state; the state will
have to subsidize its operations; it could entail a violation of banking laws because it
would have to be linked to the State Bank, Banco del Estado, and its funds will be used
for political purposes, among others (El Mercurio.com, April 19, 2014).
Regarding contributions, there is a belief both among the AFP administrators and
experts that a 10% contribution is inadequate and that what is needed is a minimum con-
tribution of at least 13% to be able to generate a sufﬁcient pension. Another proposal
involves the establishment of a mixed contributory system which will include an increase
in the compulsory savings rate to about 15% of the wages, with the additional 5% deposited
in a common fund that can be used by current retirees to increment their pensions.
The AFPs on their part are proposing that Chileans postpone their retirement age,
which currently is 65 years for men and 60 for women. According to an estimate made
by the Bravo Commission, if a woman postpones her retirement age by 5 years she
can increase her pension by 40% (Bravo Commission, Final Report). To placate a very
irate public which is quite critical of the management of the funds, the AFPs proposed
that if the afﬁliate postpones the retirement, the AFP would not charge management
fees for the years worked beyond the statutory minimum. The pension fund administrators
are also arguing in favor of an increase in the contributions because the current 10% was
established when life expectancy in Chile was 40% lower. They have also proposed to
augment the voluntary savings and provide pension education to all Chileans (El Mer-
curio.com, March 27, 2014).
Lastly the pension management institutions have proposed to increase the employers’
contributions to the retirement program (El Mercurio.com, June 20, 2014). The question
of employer’s contributions is often the last to be discussed, but not one to be ignored
because Chilean employers make the lowest contribution to their employees’ retirement
among all countries with a FF-DC system according to data provided by International Fed-
eration of Pension Fund Administrators. In Chile, the employer only contributes 1.26% of
the taxable wage, but rather than ﬁnancing pensions, it pays for the Disability and Survival
Insurance Program which has been responsibility of the employer only since 2011. In other
FF systems the employer contribution ranges from 2.8% in Bulgaria to 12% in Colombia.
Compared to other OECD countries, Chilean employers rank last, while Brazil, Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain top the list with a 20% employer contribution. While it is unclear how much
the employer should contribute in a FF program, the estimates range from 2% to 5% of the
taxable wage. As expected, representatives of the business community and right wing think
tanks argue that any increase in the employer’s tax will lead to a reduction of wages (El
Mercurio.com, June 24, 2014).
Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 69
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
en
ins
ula
 M
ed
ica
l S
ch
oo
l U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:1
4 1
0 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
The Bravo Commission was expected to present its report to President Bachelet in
January of 2015, but it has already been postponed until mid-2015. Once the report is pre-
sented and approved by the President, it has to be turned into a bill and sent to Congress. It
is expected that right wing politicians will intensely oppose both the establishment of a
state-owned AFP and any increase in employers’ contributions.
7. Conclusion
It is clear then that in Chile, as elsewhere, the design of pensions and the distribution of
retirement income, including the degree of poverty, are closely related. The privatization
of pensions was justiﬁed ideologically in terms of the normative repertoire of neoliberalism,
which insists that the free market generates better outcomes for workers than the state ever
could. This approach to pension reform has been pursued in several national jurisdictions
across Latin America and Eastern Europe, as well as in some Western European countries,
and is arguably the dominant pension reform model of the early twenty-ﬁrst century. And
yet our analysis of Chile here suggests that we should be cautious about embracing it.
A salient set of issues in Chile’s DC pension arrangement concerns excessive manage-
ment charges, and the enormous revenue streams that have been enjoyed by the country’s
pension fund managers. Moreover, a close analysis of the relationship between the AFPs
and the state indicates that the state redistributes resources toward the AFPs, and has
been subsidizing the private sector both before and after the 2008 reform. Prior to the
2008 reform, this subsidization was comprised mainly of paying for an ever growing
number of Minimum Pensions, which led in part to the 2008 reform as ﬁscal deﬁcits con-
tinued to increase. After the 2008 reform, the state has expanded its subsidizing role,
because it absolves the AFPs of any responsibility in regard to both adequate performance
and high commissions. Thus, while many are satisﬁed with the positive social impact of the
Solidarity Pillar, we argue that the provisions of the 2008 reform support the private system
in a myriad of ways, allowing the AFPs to charge high administrative fees, while failing to
generate satisfactory rates of return for their customers. Moreover, over the long term, the
architects of the 2008 reform have favored the AFPs by facilitating an expansion of the FF
scheme to independent and young workers, and by subsidizing contributions for women’s
pensions.
The 2008 reform was a step in the right direction as it tried to rectify some of the dis-
welfares of privatization, in particular by universalizing opportunities to accumulate rights
to a retirement income, including the provision of special beneﬁts for women, the self-
employed and the poor. The reform reduced discrimination against women, expanded cov-
erage to the lowest income groups and independent workers, and created positive incentives
for young and middle income workers to save for their retirement. To the extent that these
reforms have operated as a complement to the privatized system, however, any equitable
impact has been limited. Greater equity will be realized only by expanding the role of
employers, and making the AFPs more accountable both in terms of charges and proﬁts.
As for the impact of the public pensions or the PBS on poverty, the effects have been
severely limited by the low value of the PBS which is only about US $160 per month.
While, policy-makers argued that the US $160 are much better than nothing, this very
small amount does not contribute to a reduction in poverty in any meaningful way, and
poor pensioners have rightly argued that the amount provided is entirely inadequate
given Chile’s high cost of living.
In conclusion, while the pension policies have reinforced both the concentration of
income and proﬁts in the hands of six administrators, it has so far failed to have a positive
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impact on poverty, except in those areas where there are beneﬁts paid directly by the state.
In a PAYG system the transference of resources often serves as a redistributive mechanism,
especially when employers and the state supply additional funds to the retirement of those
in the lower income groups. However, in a FF–DC system there is no redistributive effect
and at least in the case of Chile the system has been exclusionary both in terms of gender
and income. Lastly our lengthy discussion on replacement rates sends another devastating
message because even for those who have participated in and contributed to a private
pension the retirement pension is inadequate.
In brief, the 35 year experience with a FF, DC model in Chile send clear messages about
the dis-welfares produced by the model and provide a number of powerful reasons to argue
that governments elsewhere who are intent on pursuing the Chilean model as a basis for
pension reform should give these issues serious consideration before they are tempted to
pull the privatization trigger.
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